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Abstract: The recent rise of authoritarian populism, fueled by the spread of digital hate speech and
the preeminence of emotions in the political arena, has not aroused much interest among educational
researchers. In response to this gap in the literature, the authors of the present article aim to provide an
overview of the educational implications of the recent wave of authoritarian populism by interviewing
a group of experts on democratic citizenship education from various countries and backgrounds.
The dialogue resulting from their responses helps to move forward the educational debate on how
schools can deal with the emotions and hate speech that motivate support for authoritarian populisms.
Keywords: populism; authoritarian populism; democratic citizenship education; emotions; digital
hate speech
1. Introduction
The rise of authoritarian populism in the last few decades has led to increasing scholarly production
related to this topic. However, populism has not aroused much interest among recent educational
researchers, despite the long tradition of democratic citizenship education from the early 20th century.
As a result, the educational system has rarely been analyzed as a factor related to the emergence of
populism or as an opportunity to mitigate populism. We are not suggesting that national populism is
mainly an educational problem. It is not. Contrary to what is usually believed, Trump’s, Bolsonaro’s,
and LePen’s voters are neither ignorant nor unable to understand the complexity of current politics [1],
at least no more than their opponents [2,3]. This is not to say, however, that different aspects of
populism such as the widespread use of digital hate speech or the increasing presence of emotions
in political debate do not have a clear educational dimension. Yet, the scope of this dimension has
not been sufficiently discussed. This fact led the authors to interview a group of experts from various
countries (Canada, Chile, Spain, the UK, and the US) who had long professional records in education
for democratic citizenship. These interviews aimed to collect their knowledge and opinions about
the relationships between education and populism, emotions, and digital media. We directly asked
experts about: (a) the educational roots and consequences of the rise of authoritarian populism, (b) the
role of school in the preeminence of feelings over reason in political judgments, and (c) the educational
challenges brought on by the new digital era that has contributed largely to the proliferation of
this phenomenon.
After reviewing the most recent academic debates on the links between populism, education,
emotion, and digital media, we present the dialogue resulting from the answers given by the participants.
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We hope that this dialogue encourages researchers in the field of democratic education to explore the
different educational implications posed by the recent rise of national populism.
2. Conceptual Framework
2.1. The Recent Rise of Authoritarian Populism
Recent unexpected results in numerous democratic elections around the world have triggered a
proliferation of publications related to populism, especially in the field of political science. The concept
of populism has been used to reference a broad range of phenomena, from certain political rhetoric
styles to the challenge to the legitimacy of the establishment [4]. For some, populism occurs with
the emergence of people as a political subject [5,6], while, for others, as Sant, Pais, McDonnell and
Menendez Alvarez-Hevia [7] explained, it is the result of charismatic leadership, party machinery,
and propaganda (see Mudde [8]).
In this article, we are concerned about the recent spread of what Norris and Inglehart [4] call
authoritarian populism or what Eatwell and Goodwin [1] term national populism. These types of populism
are characterized by the following features:
• A clear distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’. We, the ordinary citizens (the people, the silent
majority, the forgotten France, etc.), and they, the distant and corrupt elites. Populist leaders
usually promise to give a voice to those who feel that they have been neglected by corrupt elites.
It is a movement, therefore, that is questioning hegemonic Western liberal politics.
• Prioritizing the culture and interests of the nation (e.g., America first). National feelings are
exalted, and immigrants are viewed as cultural threats to the national identity. For this reason,
metaphors such as ‘disease’, ‘syndrome’ or ‘virus’ are often used by national populist leaders
to describe the foreign enemy [9]. As Eatwell and Goodwin [1] claim, “immigration and ethnic
change present an imminent risk to cultural distinctiveness of the national group, to national
values, identity and ways of life” (p. 66). The authoritarian value of security against them and
the politics of fear play a key role in this regard [4]. The COVID-19 crisis has been an illustrative
example of how populist leaders have used fear as a political weapon against migrants and other
minorities to reinforce national identities [10].
• The diffusion of demagogic narratives that enhance emotional and visceral reactions instead of
rational deliberations. Populist leaders frequently make use of personal experiences as arguments
in political debate because they are easy to understand and difficult to argue against [11].
The increasing influence of social media in campaigns has also contributed to trivializing the
political debate [12,13] and spreading hate speech [14].
Although this recent wave of populisms has been frequently associated with the 2008 financial
crisis, they in fact emerged much earlier. These populisms are the result of a systemic crisis of liberal
democracy and capitalism [15] that has had deep social transformations. Eatwell and Goodwin [1]
group these social transformations into four major societal changes. The first involves the distrust of
politicians and institutions that the elitist nature of liberal democracies has promoted among a large
number of citizens. The second refers to the fear of destruction of the national culture and identity due
to hyper-ethnic change and immigration. The third is about the rising inequalities derived from the
increasingly globalized neoliberal economies and the strong feelings of deprivation fueled by them.
Finally, the fourth refers to the dealignment caused by “the weakening bonds between the traditional
mainstream parties and the people” (p. 15). Some scholars consider that socioeconomic factors are not
enough to explain the rise of national populisms [16,17] and recognize emotions, such as fear or anger,
as key elements in understanding this new populist wave [18–20].
Sustainability 2020, 12, 6034 3 of 16
2.2. Populism and Education
National populisms pose challenges to current democracies that are not exclusive nor primarily
educational. This is not to say that they do not have clear educational implications. Some of the
previously mentioned features of authoritarian populisms have been empirically studied from an
educational perspective. For instance, researchers such as Coenders and Scheepers [21], Jenssen
and Engesbak [22], Meeusen, Vroome and Hooghe [23], Wagner and Zick [24] have thoroughly
analyzed the effect of formal education on chauvinism, ethnic prejudice, and hostility toward
immigrants. Others have also studied the educational effects on authoritarian values [25] and
political opinions [26]. However, populism, as a phenomenon, has not generated much concern
among educational researchers [15,27]. A brief look at databases such as ERIC, Scopus, or Web of
Science is enough to realize that very little work has been done in the intersectional fields of populism
and education.
The few publications related to this topic that have recently appeared mostly agree that a critical
analysis of populism can provide teachers and students with opportunities to enrich democratic
education [17]. These recent works have been primarily focused on three different, but closely
intertwined concerns: the implications of populism for democratic education [15,27,28] and the role
played by emotions [17,29] and digital media [30] in the rise of authoritarian populism. In relation to
the first matter, Sant et al. [7] have reflected on the educational implications of populism understood
in two different ways: (a) as an ideological narrative, drawing on Žižek’s theoretical work; and (b)
from the viewpoint of radical democracy, following Mouffe and Laclau’s contributions. According to
Sant et al. [7], for the first perspective, bringing populism into formal education means reproducing
“the same ideological game that it claims to challenge” (p. 51), while for the second, it implies
recognizing educational settings as political spaces. Departing from this last viewpoint, Mårdh and
Tryggvason [27] consider that “a democratic education that stems from an associative and political
understanding of democracy depends upon the notion of the people and cannot, subsequently, fully
eliminate the elements of populism” (p. 10). For this reason, they suggest bringing the concept of
populism into democratic education. Such an endeavor, however, implies the risk of opening education
up to feelings and demands that are not geared toward a democratic life. The direction of the emotions
becomes, therefore, one of the main challenges that democratic education faces. Along the same
lines, Petrie, McGregor and Crowther [15] suggest that educators should use populism ‘dialectically’
as a resource for learning democracy and to draw upon the powerful learning motive of anger to
engage students.
The affective dimension of right-wing populism and its implications for democratic education have
been analyzed further by Zembylas [17]. For this scholar, democratic education can provide teachers
and students with opportunities to critically reflect on the emotional modes through which right-wing
populisms are articulated and the possible ways to respond to those emotions. Yet, as he recognizes,
addressing issues of right-wing populism can be a serious challenge for educators in these times of
intense political polarization, when even teachers and students highly value authoritarianism [31].
For McAvoy and Hess [32], it is precisely during times of extreme political polarization that teachers
ought to create a political classroom that engages students in the practice of deliberation and collective
decision making, through the teaching of controversial issues (p. 16). Similarly, Davies [33] insists that
to work with extremism and radicalization it is necessary to address divisive issues and create what
he calls an “interruptive (turbulent) democratic classroom”, where teachers do not oppress offensive
views, but also know how to deal with the emotions which arise from debates (p. 456). This scholar also
suggests using social media to promote self-organizing horizontal networks that empower students.
The potentialities of media literacy education to halt the rise of authoritarian populisms have
been explored in a volume edited by Ranieri [30] where issues of media content analysis and civic
self-expression through media are analyzed (see, for instance, [34]). As Ranieri [30] states, political
discourses and subjectivities are currently so profoundly influenced by digital media that media
literacy education should be considered as an essential element of citizenship education. This book
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also addresses the question of how teachers can be prepared to deal with the difficulties of contrasting
discriminatory speeches and populist discourses and promote political participation among young
people [35].
In summary, emotions and digital media are the topics that have received the most interest
from educational scholars concerned with the phenomenon of populism. However, as we mentioned
before, there remains limited literature attempting to explore the relationship between education and
populism. As we will show in the next two sections, scholars from other fields have already paid
reasonable attention to the role of both digital media and emotion in the promotion or prevention of
authoritarian populisms.
2.3. Populism and Emotions
Due to the influence of the rational choice paradigm and the Enlightenment’s legacy of
the prevalence of reason over emotion, the emotional underpinnings of political behavior have
been considerably understudied. Feelings and emotions have long been viewed as something
that interferes with political decision making rather than being an integral part of information
processing [36]. In the last few decades, however, the role of emotion has emerged as a central element
to understanding political calculi. As it has been largely demonstrated, political views and actions are
not precisely the product of meticulous processing of information and the balancing of advantages and
disadvantages [2,37–42]. Deliberative and rational mental processes—including those involved in
the configuration of political ideas and identities—are also voluntarily mobilized from automatic
operations generated by impressions and emotions [43]. In other words, automatic impressions “are the
main source of explicit beliefs and deliberate choices” [43] (p. 35). Moreover, Haidt’s [44] research
on moral reasoning found that automatic intuitions are often responsible for our final moral and
political judgments. Indeed, individuals look for reasons that support their initial insights. The intense
emotional adhesions of political opinions and judgments make them especially resistant to change and
critical review [37,38,42]. As Westen [42] provocatively stated in his book The Political Brain, “in politics,
when reason and emotion collide, emotion invariably wins” (p. 35).
Authoritarian populisms are also largely driven by emotions. Indeed, populist movements
are usually described as an expression of certain negative sentiments and reactions [45]. Fear and
anger are the emotions most frequently connected to the spread of authoritarian populisms [16,46,47].
These emotions play a key role in the rhetoric of national populist parties, especially when framing
issues such as immigration, national culture, unemployment, and political distrust. Fear, for instance,
has been widely used by authoritarian populist leaders in order to legitimize their policy proposals
and offer simple answers to this fear by constructing clear enemies [4,47]. Anger, on the other hand,
has been defined as an “indispensable political emotion” [48] (p. 133). Studies on the political effects of
emotions have found that anger promotes mobilization during election campaigns more than other
emotions such as anxiety and enthusiasm [49,50]. Moreover, anger stimulates support for populist
forces among citizens with low political efficacy [46]. Anxiety, in contrast, is less mobilizing than
anger [49] and not a determiner of populist support [45]. In fact, the political judgments people make
when they are anxious tend to be more rational and deliberative, as they usually elevate the risk of
action [51] and have emotional incentives to become better informed [52]. However, some suggest that
anxiety decreases participation in costly participatory actions [49]. Other scholars have also pointed
out that repressed shame resulting from not living up to the expectations of the increasingly globalized
labor market often transforms into anger against those who oppose one’s social identity and support
authoritarian populist parties [16].
Yet, despite the increasing attention given by political scientists and psychologists to emotions
in political behavior and the rise of populism, many citizenship education programs and studies are
still based on the Cartesian tradition of cogito, ergo sum [53,54] and the notion of the ‘dispassionate
citizen’ [55]. In other words, the idea of a citizen as a rational, permanently active, and non-contradictory
political subject whose essential characteristics can be learned by students after a guided pedagogical
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process. This idealized vision of citizenship education dismisses the importance of the automatic ways
individuals think and act, as well as the resistance to critical review that individual and collective
emotions and identities exert [53,56]. As a growing number of scholars warn, citizenship learning
requires both cognitive and affective engagement (e.g., [17,57–59]). This affective engagement may
require the arousal of emotions of anger and anxiety, confronting the tradition of what Hermans calls
the ‘smiling fascism’ [60].
In conclusion, any citizenship education proposal needs to consider that emotions are an intrinsic
part of human thinking and that rational decisions cannot be made without emotions [61,62]. For this
reason, educational research should address the key question of how schools and citizenship education
programs can deal with the feelings and emotions that motivate support for authoritarian populisms.
As Petrie, McGregor, and Crowther [14] say, “a curriculum to engage with either representations of
populism or populist representations will have to make space for exploring emotions as locations of,
and resources for, political learning and struggle” (p. 493). Finally, but not less important, there is a
need to analyze the role of school—as a powerful socialization tool—in the spread of emotions that
foster undemocratic discourses [33].
2.4. Populism and Digital Media
Although the relationship between the rise of populism and social media usage needs to be
further explored, increasing evidence reveals that the process of mediatization of society has led
political actors to adapt their discourses to the digital age; moreover, social media plays a key role
in spreading political discourses, especially those created by right-wing populists [63]. Additionally,
the increasing influence of social media in political campaigns has largely contributed to trivializing the
political debate [12,13]. However, citizens are not only receivers of these discourses, but also producers.
Digital natives also create new narratives on social media environments that reinforce extremism and
nationalist discourses [11,64]. In fact, the Internet seems to be more beneficial for right-wing hate and
extremist groups than for political moderates [65]. One of the reasons for this phenomenon could
be the personalization of the newsfeed that social media networking sites offer. The ‘bubble’ that
they create by steering people toward information that appeals to their ideology and preconceptions
fuels political polarization [66,67]. Another reason for this may be attributed to the fact that some
extremist opinions are not convenient in certain forums. As Mammone, Godin, and Jenkins [68] have
studied, extremist discourses emerge in environments where people are not judged and can find other
people with similar interests and concerns. These environments help develop feelings of solidarity,
loyalty, and discipline, as people “can share their emotions and express their feelings without fear of
stigmatization” (p. 8).
Other relationships among young people with extremist ideologies, populism, and the Internet
can also be established. As Ranieri [30] suggests, young people “as intense users of the Internet... are
exposed to discriminatory content while their cognitive and affective development is still unstable”
(p. 24). According to Krasteva and Lazaridis [11], there are several interrelated processes that
strengthen the following elements: extremist community building, anonymity, and the dissidence
of new generations. In relation to the first, joining an extremist group on the Internet is as easy as
clicking a ‘join’ button on any social media group page, regardless of how far those people are from
each other. Moreover, extremist political profiles are more active on average than moderate ones [11].
Furthermore, the anonymity permitted in most Internet forums is an advantage for spreading populist
discourses, as it allows people to express those opinions that would otherwise be kept private. In fact,
“electronically mediated and often anonymous communication eschews political and social control
more than face-to-face propaganda and therefore leaves room for racist, sexist or homophobic political
messages” [69] (p. 27). Finally, the Internet is a place where young people are able to express their
lack of respect toward authorities and to the norms of political correctness and challenge them by
overproducing hate speech.
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Hate speech as an Internet phenomenon has become a major social issue, and it has been recently
approached from an educational perspective (e.g., [70–76]). De Latour et al. [77] claim that hate
speech is one of the most intolerant and xenophobic actions of today. According to these scholars,
policy administrators that seek to eradicate hate speech, such as the Council of Europe, consider
education a crucial starting point for achieving this goal. For Emcke [78], hate is collective and
ideological. The social representations used to categorize, make judgments, and humiliate are not
spontaneously elaborated, but are already established [79]. In this regard, Parekh [80] distinguishes
four characteristics in hate speech that are strongly related to populism’s main features: (a) it delimits
an individual or group from a set of characteristics, (b) it stigmatizes by assigning to a group of people
a set of characteristics regarded as undesirable, (c) it generalizes the stereotype in such a way that it is
considered to be present in all the members of the group, and (d) the group is excluded from ‘normal’
social relationships and considered hostile and unacceptable.
In this scenario, many scholars consider building counter hate speech narratives to be a priority
for social studies education and critical digital media literacy [81–83]. For Arroyo et al. [82], building
counter-hate speech narratives is a process that begins with the identification of the conflict and its
contextualization by determining which people are involved, assessing the arguments presented,
and interpreting the emotions that the narrative evokes. They argue that human rights should be
the basis on which these counter hate speech narratives are constructed. Other authors such as
Sulzer [83] advocate for direct treatment of political power in digital environments due to its role in
the proliferation of fake news and hate speech narratives. These scholars agree that a critical approach
to digital media literacy is necessary to avoid an “overly technocratic and acritical framing” [84] (p. 13)
that presents technologies as neutral devices [81].
3. Materials and Methods
The steady, worldwide spread of authoritarian populism poses relevant questions for educational
research that need to be further discussed and analyzed. The authors of this article aim to provide
a general overview of the educational implications of the recent rise of authoritarian populism
by interviewing a group of scholars, experts in democratic citizenship education, from different
countries and backgrounds. Specifically, the authors interviewed the following scholars: Antoni
Santisteban (Autonomous University of Barcelona, Spain), E. Wayne Ross (University of British
Columbia, Canada), Edda Sant (Manchester Metropolitan University, UK), Gustavo E. Fischman
(Arizona State University, US), Jesús Romero (University of Cantabria, Spain), and Sixtina Pinochet
(Católica del Norte University, Chile).
The selection of the participants was based on the following criteria. We chose scholars,
both male and female, located in different countries. By doing this, our aim was not to focus on the
particularities of each country nor to make any comparison, but to gain a broader view of the topic
from multiple perspectives. We also selected scholars who had long professional records of education
for democratic citizenship and, in particular, who have shown in their publications a concern regarding
the rise of populisms (e.g., [7,85–88]) and the issues of emotions and digital media in democratic
education (e.g., [53,89,90]).
In the literature review conducted, we identified three main topics from the scarce publications
on populism and education: the implications of populism on democratic education and the role
played by the emotions and digital media in the recent rise of authoritarian populism. These three
broad topics steered not only the participants’ selection criteria, but also the interview questions.
In particular, the interviewees were asked about: (a) the educational roots and consequences of the
rise of authoritarian populism, (b) the role of school in the preeminence of feelings over reason in
political judgments, and (c) the educational challenges of the new digital era with the recent rise of
authoritarian populism. The first question posed to the scholars intended to fill a gap in the literature,
as the few researchers that have reflected on the relationship between populism and formal education
have departed instead from a left-wing view of populism [7,15,27]. The second question aimed to
Sustainability 2020, 12, 6034 7 of 16
have the scholars reflect not only on the affective dimension of citizenship education, but also on
the less-explored issue of the role of formal education, either active or passive [33], in the increasing
omnipresence of emotions in the political arena. Finally, the third question sought for responses
focused on the educational challenges, not only the potentialities [34], brought on by the new digital
era that has largely contributed to the recent proliferation of authoritarian populisms.
Scholars received the questions in advance. The interviews were conducted online in May 2019
and each lasted about 45 minutes. Afterwards, the audio recordings of the interviews were transcribed
in full and participants were asked for feedback on the transcripts. The authors conducted a conceptual
content analysis of the qualitative data [91] to discern patterns and themes. The transcriptions were
open coded using Atlas.ti. Themes were derived from patterned codes that arose out of merging
statements with similar meanings. The themes resulting from examining the answers given by the
participants are presented below.
4. Results
4.1. The Non-Educational Roots of the Recent Rise of Populism
The majority of the educators interviewed pointed out that the rise of authoritarian populism
is not mainly an educational problem and, therefore, that it cannot be concluded that schools have
a major and direct responsibility in the spread of this phenomenon. They attributed various social,
political, and economic causes to the recent rise of populism. Some participants highlighted the role of
economic liberalization policies and liberal elitist democracies in the spread of national populisms:
The incubator of the national-populist germ was what Snyder called the ‘politics of
inevitability’. These ‘politics of inevitability’, hegemonic in the West since the 1980s, made
sacred (by denying any viable alternative) deregulated capitalism, market fundamentalism
and an idea of democracy as a mechanism to choose between competing elites (Jesús Romero).
As this Spanish academic explained, this ‘politics of inevitability’ created the propitiatory
conditions (increasing economic inequalities, feelings of deprivation, etc.) to mobilize a Manichean
rhetoric that exalts ‘the people’ defined in terms of the national identity versus the enemies that damage
it (including politicians, technocrats, immigrants, refugees, ‘out of touch liberals’ who despise the
Nation, privileged minorities, etc.)
Others stressed the degradation of democratic institutions as the most important factor in
widespread populism. Professor E. Wayne Ross, for example, stated that:
We still have all the forms, we have elections, we have governments that are said to be
representative of the people, we have courts, Congress, Parliament, but those forms are just
that: they are just forms. Everything that matters about what should be happening in those
institutional settings has been . . . the meaning has been so corrupted that the content of
democracy does not exist, even though the forms of democracy exist. And you can see that
in a lot of different ways. The plutocracy is the democracy we have.
For this reason, he warned that “we can no longer rely on tropes of teaching students about liberal
democracy or teaching students what it means to be an active citizen in a democratic society and think
that’s enough”. He clearly differentiated between populism (a political movement that comes from the
bottom) and what is usually called right-wing populism that he described as a twenty-first-century
version of fascism. As he argued, if democracy is the platform and the enabler for right-wing populism
today, the idea of democracy is “completely bankrupt”.
Edda Sant from the UK identified the crisis of representative democracy as the main cause of
populism, describing it as an expression of the democratic deficit. Following Mouffe and Laclau,
this academic considered that many issues that were previously depoliticized have been brought into
the discussion by populist movements, which has made many citizens feel attracted to politics again.
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4.2. Schooling as a Failed Opportunity to Halt Authoritarian Populisms
While being cautious of attributing the recent rise of authoritarian populism to schooling, most of
the scholars interviewed recognized the failure of formal education systems to strengthen democratic
institutions and promote active citizenship.
For Antoni Santisteban, school is an institution that does not educate for civic participation and the
resolution of social problems. According to him, schools have a great responsibility to teach democratic
skills and, if they serve as spaces for democratic experience, can be a key tool for combating populist
discourse. He recognized that schools are not the only space for political socialization, and probably not
the most influential either, but they are crucial for learning political participation. For many students,
schools are the only place where they can experience democratic deliberation and participation. As he
said in his interview:
We need to make students the protagonists of their learning process. This learning has to be
based on their life experiences in order to situate themselves in time and space. We need to
help them to make decisions about the affairs that concern their communities. They need
to understand that democracy is the responsibility of everyone, that it is more than a
political system, it is a way of life. Teachers have the opportunity to choose whether to
encourage passivity and indifference to non-democratic attitudes, or, on the contrary, to teach
participation to deal with controversial issues. Teachers can always choose.
In the same line, Gustavo E. Fischman pointed out that even though schools are not a ‘democratic
paradise’ and very often do not educate for citizen participation, they are much less authoritarian,
violent, and discriminatory than any other social institution. After all, as he warned, it cannot be
forgotten that things would be much worse without schools. This does not mean, however, that the
achievements obtained by citizenship movements could be attributed to the school. As he clearly
stated when talking about Brazil:
Bolsonaro’s government has generated a pro-democratic reaction among young people in
Brazil that is not the merit of schools, it is the merit of the people. The school institution is in
debt with the people.
In this regard, E. Wayne Ross also recognized, somehow disillusioned, that schools only reflect
what society is and that they are not a leading force of change: “I want to believe that schools offer the
best place to organize because they are one of the last places where people of different backgrounds
can come together”. Furthermore, Jesús Romero highlighted that the attack on comprehensive school
reforms accentuated the tendency to educate children with their ‘equals’ separated from the ‘different’.
Such a tendency, he added, is not only an expression of the growing inequality but also promotes
increasingly separated and distant lives. The ignorance of the ‘other’ favors the advance of prejudice,
the feeling of threat, and the consequent defensive reactions of an essentialized ‘we’ that does not
recognize the ‘others’ in their otherness. Citing Simón [92], he stated that:
Appeals to insecurity and the loss of symbolic and effective status are more common in
relatively homogeneous communities since it is easier to blame a foreign community with
which there is little or no contact. On the contrary, more heterogeneous areas seem to vote
comparatively less for extremist parties.
4.3. Obstacles to Critical Thinking at Schools
For all the scholars interviewed, critical thinking is crucial in confronting the anti-democratic
narratives that right-wing populist leaders and movements spread. However, they mentioned three
closely intertwined curricular matters that noticeably hinder the development of critical thinking at
school. The first refers to the lack of attention to controversial issues in the classroom. The second
Sustainability 2020, 12, 6034 9 of 16
involves the tendency of social studies education to disconnect past events from present affairs.
The third is related to the traditional nationalizing role of school curricula.
For Jesús Romero, education should enable children to ask progressively more complex questions
about how to live in society and how to collectively face its fractures and problems using the tools of
critical and self-critical reason. He thinks that schools should help students challenge the demagogic
and emotional narratives of national populism, and the ‘politics of inevitability’ origin. However,
as he warned, the widespread ‘curricular escapism’ (the expression is from Derricott) that refuses
the treatment of controversial public affairs in the classroom denies students space to critically
dismantle narratives and build counter-narratives “from more rigorous knowledge and more wisely
informed desires”.
Sixtina Pinochet also emphasized the importance of including socially sensitive topics in schools.
This scholar expressed her concerns about the strength of the idea of neutrality in education and how
this assumption has largely hindered addressing relevant social issues in classrooms and promoting
understanding between opposing groups. As she stated in her interview, “by avoiding these issues,
we are creating spaces for authoritarian views to spread”. Edda Sant and Antoni Santisteban used
similar arguments to advocate for including controversial issues and relevant social problems into the
school curriculum. As Edda Sant explained in her interview, schools have not included these topics
“because we were afraid that some voices [laden with values that we did not like] would come out in
the classroom”. Silencing these voices, however, has only reinforced them.
For E. Wayne Ross, the idea of including controversial issues in the classroom is intrinsically
related to his understanding of the nature of critical knowledge:
We will never get to objectivity in teaching the curriculum unless everything can be discussed.
If something is excluded from discussion, we only have a knowledge that is approved, that
comes from authority, dogma, or tradition and that it is not subjected to critical analysis.
This is the equivalent of prejudice. Using the logic that John Dewey laid out in terms of a
pragmatic, a philosophically pragmatic approach to understanding the world, you have to
be able to test out all the hypotheses and if there are things we can’t talk about, we can’t test
them and, therefore, they can’t ever rise to the level of being truths in a pragmatic sense.
For this professor, the development of critical thinking at school is also limited by the tendency to
present social phenomena, such as the recent growth of authoritarianism, as if they “rise out of nothing”.
According to him, social studies educators should help students think historically and dialectically
about the connections between the past, the present, and the future and he criticized that social
phenomena are usually “treated as if they don’t have a past, they just somehow appeared, so that Hitler
was the person who becomes responsible for the whole problem”. For him, historical, revolutionary
events should be rescued by social studies educators to serve as an example of how the socio-economic
structures can be collectively transformed. This idea of the relevance of historical awareness is also
expressed by the Chilean scholar Sixtina Pinochet. She claimed that her generation values democracy
more than younger generations because younger generations lack a deep understanding of what
happened during Pinochet’s dictatorship, as this issue is treated very superficially in Chilean schools.
In addition, both Jesús Romero and E. Wayne Ross alluded to the traditional nationalizing role
of schooling as a clear impediment to the development of critical thinking skills. As highlighted by
Jesús Romero, the strong survival of territorial identity markers in school curricula helps maintain
the vision of ‘our country or region first’ that is responsible, to some extent, for the visceral rejections
to the ‘others’ and to any criticism that questions national identities. E. Wayne Ross related the
promotion of nationalism through schooling as a means of social control and reproduction of the
socio-economic order. According to him, schools provide idealized narratives about the rise of nations
and the functioning of democracies that limit one’s self-thinking and self-determination. As he claimed:
In the US, the school system was primarily focused on Americanizing people and accepting
the dominant social, economic framework. And I think the schooling was aimed at convincing
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young children that there is no other alternative to the capitalist worldview. I am not saying
that everybody that teaches in schools is doing something evil necessarily, but I do think
that socialization is the main option... Chomsky writes about manufacturing consent and
what controls a democratic society, and he actually writes a book on the necessary illusions.
And my colleague and friend Gibson has a phrase that I think is really good. He talks
about schools as illusion factories. I think we create these illusions when we think about
these particular kinds of narratives about the rise of the nation, the role of religion, or the
individuals in society or about democracy.
4.4. The Emotional Challenge for Critical Citizenship Education
Most of the scholars interviewed agreed that schools should develop children’s critical thinking
skills to help them challenge the demagogic, toxic, and anti-democratic narratives that mobilize,
in Jesús Romero’s words, “passionate and visceral reactions instead of rational deliberation”. However,
very few raised concerned about the affective dimension of citizenship education.
Edda Sant argued that emotions are the basis of reasoning and that fighting emotions and values
such as fear of the ‘other’ or racism cannot come from reason, because it can generate even greater
resistance. Instead, she proposed making students feel and understand that democratic values such
as equality are of vital importance in their daily lives. Therefore, the role of school in this regard is
not to impose certain rationality over certain values, but “to combat certain values that are not very
democratic with values that have a more important democratic dimension” (Edda Sant).
Edda Sant also advocated for letting students express their opinions freely while discussing
controversial issues. She insisted on the importance of not suppressing certain voices for being
politically incorrect because, as she explained, they come from people who are suffering and who have
a strong sense of oppression. Instead, it would be better to provide them with an alternative vision of
the causes of their suffering. In line with her critique of representative democracy, she claimed that
schools should offer students different possibilities and models of democracy that go beyond “voting
every four years”. According to her, this would make that students feel more engaged in politics.
Gustavo E. Fischman also expressed concerns about the preeminence of the Cartesian rationalist
premise in schools when warning about the difficulties of balancing skepticism and critical thinking
with emotions such as anxiety. For this scholar, the act of doubt generates an emotional instability that
teachers should take into account when fostering critical thinking. As he said in his interview:
We must raise doubts about the claims that appear without too many foundations beyond
‘it was said by the authority, the pope, the president or the enemy’. But, at the same time,
we must work with the emotion and anxiety that those doubts create... Eliminating doubts is
a very appropriate way to survive because, otherwise, anxiety levels would generate a lot of
emotional instability that may affect our health. For this reason, we must generate doubts,
but also generate possibilities to answer those doubts in an appropriate way (not with the
populist responses of ‘the bad ones are out there’) and try to understand how these structures
are generated.
4.5. The Educational Implications of the Digital Era
The scholars interviewed had different views on the role of new technologies in the recent rise
of populism and, accordingly, different opinions about the educational implications of the digital
era. Some of them highlighted the virtues that new technologies have had for democracy, although
they also mentioned some disadvantages. For instance, Sixtina Pinochet stated that the Internet has
greatly contributed to democracy by providing easy and widespread access to a huge amount of
information, even though she also recognized that it has also created the illusion that everything on
the Internet is true: “it seems that nowadays the idea that prevails is that everything that appears
in social networks is real when most of the time is not”. Antoni Santisteban argued that, at least to
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some extent, this behavior is due to educational reasons. He considers that an education that transmits
information without questioning teaches citizens to do the same in their everyday lives. According
to him, digital media is the broadest source of information, but it is also a place where most of the
content is “rubbish, advertisements, and spectacle”. Therefore, he considered it necessary to teach
children how to select, contrast, and analyze relevant information and identify who is represented and
who is missing in the text. Gustavo E. Fischman also agreed that it is crucial to teach critical thinking
skills to help students question information. Yet, he insisted that teachers should generate questions
“but also generate possibilities to answer those questions in an appropriate way”. He also added that
teaching critical thinking is not easy considering current educational systems and the underfunding of
education in many countries.
Edda Sant stressed that digital tools provide the opportunity to speak out to people who have
traditionally been silenced while being aware that these devices have also given voice to authoritarian
ideologies. Accordingly, she claimed that education in the digital era should help students critically
analyze hate-speech discourses and empower them:
I don’t think we can stop discourses we don’t like in social networks. We could obviously
analyze them, and we can help students to talk about and discuss these topics and use them
as a source, but we can’t stop them. What we can do is help [make sure] everyone has a voice
in that media.
In the case of E. Wayne Ross, instead of pointing out the benefits of digital technologies, he insisted
that “these tools are neutral”; therefore, they do not have “to be per se a negative thing”. However,
while acknowledging that technology is not the source of the problem, he recognized that it has
contributed to the rapid rise of extreme right-wing ideologies and manifestations of racism and
xenophobia. This does not mean that he advocates for a more restrictive use of technology in schools.
For him, the digital era is challenging the authority of teachers and the content of teaching up to a
point that “the way we think about the delivery of education might be coming to an end”.
Jesús Romero was probably the most skeptical in this debate. According to him, the digital era
poses four serious challenges to democracy that critical social studies education must face. The first
relates to the illusion of digital activism, which refers to the idea that the Internet and social media offer
people tools for mobilization while providing an illusory sense of efficacy that discourages people from
collaborating offline [67]. Secondly, these technologies have largely contributed to the degradation
of political language and debate. Thirdly, our tendency to ignore what does not adapt to our prior
beliefs (confirmation bias) has been accentuated by bubble filters (the algorithms that outline our
footprint through social networks), which reinforces prejudices and political polarization. Finally,
he argued that propaganda and collective manipulation are stronger than ever before because social
media networking sites collect and store a huge amount of information (big data) that enterprises use
to more precisely manipulate citizens’ feelings and emotions. As he asserted, social media has become
the new battleground for political parties (perhaps especially for populist leaders); therefore, social
media is an important space of political socialization. This space “has its own logic and functioning
mechanisms, game rules and a different set of possibilities, limits and biases”. For him, citizenship
education should help students deconstruct the logic of this socializing instance that is shaping their
perceptions and notions of political reality.
5. Discussion
The recent rise of populism has become a major social issue with profound implications in many
fields, including education. However, these implications have not been sufficiently discussed in
educational literature. For this reason, the authors of the present article interviewed a group of experts
on democratic citizenship education from various countries (Canada, Chile, Spain, the UK, and the US)
to provide a general overview of the educational consequences of the steady, worldwide spread of
authoritarian populism.
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According to these scholars, educational policies and practices may not be direct contributors
to the ascent of extremist political movements. Instead, they are indirect contributors because they
miss a unique opportunity to strengthen democratic institutions. For the most part, current societies
have the appearance of democracies, but are actually driven by economic interests and neoliberal
values that have been primarily responsible for the rise of national populisms, as other scholars have
shown [93–95]. They claimed that if the aim is to make democracies truly democratic, where citizens
have the right to vote and the right to actively participate in public decision making, it is necessary to
rethink institutions, political and economic priorities, and educational systems at all levels.
In line with other authors (e.g., [96,97]), these scholars criticized that the school curriculum has
traditionally provided idealized narratives about the rise of nations and the functioning of democracies
that have helped feed the idea of ‘our country first’ and the acceptance of the socio-economic order.
For the academics interviewed, by refusing to teach current public affairs, schools deny students
the possibility of critically analyzing social problems and collectively discussing potential solutions.
For this reason, they strongly advocated for teaching controversial issues in the classroom, especially
in these times of political polarization. In line with other scholars in the field (e.g., [98,99]), they argued
that it is only possible to critically dismantle hate-speech discourses and build counter-narratives by
including these topics in schools. However, disarticulating opinions that collide with values such as
tolerance, equity, or social justice is not an easy endeavor. Visceral resistance and reactions constitute
a huge challenge. However, the emotional aspect of citizenship education was overlooked by most
of the academics interviewed. While they offer clear routes to developing critical thinking (such as
teaching controversial issues, thinking dialectically of the connections between the past and the present,
and impugning the nationalizing role of school curricula), guidelines were much more blurred when
dealing with the affective dimension of democratic education. Some of them highlighted the issue of
not suppressing certain voices, as other scholars have warned [33,59]. Others stressed the importance
of taking into account students’ anxiety toward criticism by offering them opportunities to address
their doubts. However, the question of how schools can deal with the feelings of fear and anger that
motivate support for authoritarian populisms is still rather uncertain. The issue of the role of schooling
in the increasing omnipresence of emotions in the political arena remains unknown too.
In relation to the educational challenge posed by digital media, the academics interviewed think
that the Internet and social media have increased the urgency of developing critical thinking skills,
which remain infrequent even among undergraduate students [100]. By teaching critical thinking skills
in this context, students need to analyze pieces of digital information and be able to deconstruct the
logic of this media to understand how our beliefs are shaped by different enterprises and political
campaigns, as other scholars advocate as well (e.g., [83]). For others, it also means empowering
individuals and collectives to participate in democracy and transform social structures. From their
responses, new questions have arisen: How do we deal with the emotional manipulation caused by
social media networking sites? How can we make children and young people more aware of the
bubble filters that reinforce political polarization and what alternatives can we offer them? How can
teachers promote students’ digital activism without discouraging political participation offline?
The need to respond to these educational issues becomes more urgent now that the COVID-19
crisis has favored the spread of xenophobic conspiracy speculations and discriminatory narratives and
strengthened exclusionary nationalistic feelings.
The interviews with these scholars have shown that authoritarian populisms pose several
challenges to democratic citizenship education and school systems that are far from being solved.
Formal education still has a deep impact, either by action or by omission, on the construction of political
judgements and subjectivities. However, in the last few decades, digital media has clearly gained
territory in the political socialization of the youth, especially in the field of emotions. For schools
to regain this territory, they can no longer ignore controversial issues, voices and feelings. That is,
they can no longer pretend to be politically neutral.
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